An interim order protecting mortgaged property may depend on a payment deadline. An intended appeal raises a separate question: has the required notice actually been lodged? Treating both as a general promise that a dispute is “still in court” can obscure what protection remains.
In Labos Technologies (K) Limited and two others v HFC Limited, Court of Appeal at Nairobi, Civil Application No. E239 of 2026, ruling dated 12 June 2026, Justice S. ole Kantai refused to extend time for an appeal. The applicants relied on delayed proceedings, but the judge found inordinate, unexplained delay. The motion was dismissed with costs to HFC. (PDF pages 1 and 4–5.)
Protection tied to a condition
The application concerned High Court directions of 11 February 2026. As recounted in the ruling, the applicants had been required to make a payment towards arrears by 30 March 2026. In default, interim protection would lapse and the lender could resume recovery within the law, including commencing exercise of its statutory power of sale. (Page 2.)
The appellate judge found that the payment condition had not been met and the interim orders had lapsed. That finding matters more than the bare existence of the earlier injunction. A document showing that protection was once granted does not, by itself, establish that it continued after a condition failed. (Page 4.)
HFC's account was that the mortgaged property had subsequently been sold at public auction on 28 April 2026 and that a substantial balance remained recoverable. The ruling records those assertions when considering opposition to the extension. It should not be presented as a separate appellate trial validating every aspect of the auction or the purchaser's title. (Pages 2–4.)
A notice is not the complete appeal record
The applicants said they had failed to meet the timelines because of delay obtaining proceedings. They also maintained that their intended appeal had strong prospects and that an extension would not prejudice the respondent. These were the applicants' grounds, not findings that their proposed appeal would succeed. (Pages 1–2.)
The judge drew a concrete procedural distinction. Proceedings were not needed to lodge a notice of appeal, which used the standard form prescribed by the rules. The ruling described a 14-day notice period under rule 77 and a separate period for lodging the record under rule 84. Waiting for the material needed in the record did not explain failing to initiate the appeal. (Page 5.)
The notice exhibited was dated 8 May 2026, nearly three months after the directions, and had not been lodged. The judge also found no letter requesting proceedings and nothing showing steps taken to pursue the appeal. The problem was therefore not merely a missing transcript: the explanation lacked evidence of timely action. (Page 5.)
What the refusal does—and does not—establish
Extension of time was discretionary. The ruling identified the length and explanation of delay, possible prospects of success and prejudice to the respondent as relevant considerations. On this record, the judge declined to exercise that discretion in the applicants' favour. (Pages 4–5.)
This was a refusal of additional time, not a final determination of the underlying proprietary dispute. The source does not identify a parcel or its county, and this account has not checked later proceedings. Buyers, owners and advisers should distinguish the order sought, the order actually made and any condition governing its duration.
For parcel due diligence, litigation status is one evidence layer, not an ownership certificate. See how ArdhiScore works with available court, gazette and field parcel intelligence. Availability and coverage vary; that information does not replace professional advice or transaction-specific checks.