A refusal to permit a further appeal can sound like the end of a property dispute. This ruling shows why that shortcut is unsafe. For a buyer, lender or adviser, the practical question is not simply who won, but which application the court decided and which issues remained outside it.
In Thrift Estates Limited & Dakagi Holdings Limited v Etrade Limited & Equatorial Commercial Bank, the Court of Appeal at Nairobi considered Civil Application No. SUP 17 of 2019 (UR 11/2019). Its ruling, delivered on 22 May 2020, concerned leave and certification for an intended Supreme Court appeal, not a trial judgment resolving the main suit. The Judiciary’s official decision collection contains the ruling discussed here (p. 1, caption; p. 9, dated closing).
How the dispute reached certification
According to the Court’s background account, land secured a loan, repayment default followed, and the bank advertised an auction. Litigation and negotiations followed. The ruling then recounted a sale to the first respondent and further proceedings seeking to prevent transfer, including an injunction later challenged on appeal (pp. 1–3, paras. 1–6).
The Court recorded that its earlier appellate judgment had allowed the appeals and cross-appeal, setting aside the challenged rulings and the injunction. That history explains the applicants’ next step; it is not a fresh approval of the sale in the certification ruling. The Court expressly identified the underlying appeal as concerning interlocutory injunction rulings (p. 3, paras. 6–7).
The applicants argued that reliance on section 99 of the Land Act had overlooked protections they said section 97 supplied. Their proposed questions included challenges to the sale and the removal of injunctive protection. Those were arguments seeking a further appeal, not findings that the sale was unlawful or that damages had been awarded (pp. 3–5, paras. 7–11).
Why the application failed
The question before the Court was whether the intended appeal involved a matter of general public importance. Applying the Hermanus Steyn principles quoted in this ruling, it required more than a dispute important to these parties: the relevant legal question needed wider public significance and prior judicial determination (pp. 6–8, para. 13).
The Court observed that the property had already been sold more than a year before the second injunction. It said the section 97 issue had not been before it for determination in the earlier appeal, so it could not transmit that issue to the Supreme Court through this application (p. 8, para. 14).
At the ruling date, the Court said the main suit remained undetermined. It explained that section 97 could be addressed there if the parties raised it, with later appellate steps available if circumstances permitted. This was a historical procedural explanation, not assurance about the case’s position today (p. 8, para. 15).
The Court found the section 97 request premature in the judicial sequence, no demonstrated conflict in interpreting sections 97 and 99, and no issue extending beyond the parties’ interests. It dismissed the leave and certification application with costs to the respondents. It did not dismiss the main suit, grant leave, set aside the sale or award damages (p. 9, paras. 16–17).
Read the order before drawing the conclusion
For diligence, separate the auction record, interim orders, appellate decisions and any later trial outcome. Keep each document’s date and procedural purpose visible so an old order does not become an unsupported present-day assurance. This note does not establish subsequent litigation, present ownership, occupation or enforcement; earlier proceedings are described only through this ruling.
See how ArdhiScore works. Available court, gazette and field evidence can support monitoring and professional diligence, subject to availability and scope. It cannot guarantee complete coverage, certify title or prevent loss, and does not imply access to registry systems or private bank records. Obtain current official records and qualified advice before acting.